Keywords: stakeholder management, path dependence, airlines, mergers and acquisitions, case study Stakeholder management and path dependence 3 Stable evolutionary periods of organizational development are occasionally disrupted by revolutionary transitions, usually catalyzed by environmental or intra-organizational shocks (Choo, 2008) . To cope with these transitions, organizations are compelled to radically reformulate their strategies and structures (Amis, Slack, and Hinings, 2004; Miller and Friesen, 1980; Tushman and Romanelli, 1985). These re-formulations also engage and concern various organizational stakeholders. However, stakeholder research has largely ignored the examination of unexpected transitions and focused on static phases and power relations (for notable exceptions, see Jawahar and McLaughlin, 2001; Winn, 2001; Pajunen, 2006a; Schneper and Guillen, 2004). We believe that this focus on stable rather than changing stakeholderorganization relationships is a consequence of the structural nature of the stakeholder theory.
Stable evolutionary periods of organizational development are occasionally disrupted by revolutionary transitions, usually catalyzed by environmental or intra-organizational shocks (Choo, 2008) . To cope with these transitions, organizations are compelled to radically reformulate their strategies and structures (Amis, Slack, and Hinings, 2004; Miller and Friesen, 1980; Tushman and Romanelli, 1985) . These re-formulations also engage and concern various organizational stakeholders. However, stakeholder research has largely ignored the examination of unexpected transitions and focused on static phases and power relations (for notable exceptions, see Jawahar and McLaughlin, 2001; Winn, 2001; Pajunen, 2006a; Schneper and Guillen, 2004) . We believe that this focus on stable rather than changing stakeholderorganization relationships is a consequence of the structural nature of the stakeholder theory.
Hence, more dynamic perspectives are needed to complement the extant theory on stakeholder management.
We address this issue by turning to the notion of path dependence. In other fields of strategic management (e.g. Barnett and Burgelman, 1996; Burgelman and Grove, 2007; Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997) and social sciences in general (Page, 2006 ) the understanding of path dependence, as a process determined by initial conditions and increasing returns, has found to be useful to deal with organizational transitions (cf. Barnett and Burgelman, 1996; Burgelman and Grove, 2007; Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997) . Specifically, in this study we seek to clarify the role of stakeholders prior and during an organizational transition and show how transitions may escalate towards a positive outcome or conflict depending on the initial conditions and process dynamics.
In other words, we show how and why path dependence is manifested in organizational transitions from a stakeholder management perspective.
Stakeholder management and path dependence 4 Our study contributes to the management literature in three ways. First, our examination of path dependence creates an explicit process perspective (cf. Mohr, 1982; Langley, 1999) with potential explanatory power for analyzing stakeholder management issues. As we illustrate, only a process perspective can explain the causal structure of a successful or failed organizational transition: the danger lies not in the repertoire of actions but rather in the sequence of the actions (cf. Page, 2006; Lamberg and Parvinen, 2003) . Second, this path dependent perspective improves understanding of organizational transitions in the context of a complex web of contract commitments (Argyres and Liebeskind, 1999) and suddenly increasing dynamics (Burgelman and Grove, 2007) . We demonstrate how initial conditions -that is, negative stakeholderorganization relationships -may be accentuated by the top management team's sequence of actions, offering a plausible explanation for why organizational transitions may result in unexpected outcomes. Furthermore, we show why the attempts to heal the initial relational problems between the focal organization and its key stakeholders often fail in organizational transitions.
Literature review and propositions

Stakeholder dynamics in organizational decision-making
Stakeholder research has repeatedly demonstrated that an organization cannot survive in the long run unless it provides fair treatment to its key stakeholders (cf. Freeman, 1984; Carroll, 1991; Clarkson, 1995; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Jawahar and McLaughlin, 2001; Kochan and Rubinstein, 2000; Mitchell et al., 1997; Pajunen, 2006a; Rowley and Moldoveanu, 2003; Savage et al., 1991; Mason, Kirkbride and Bryde, 2007; Wolfe and Putler, 2002) . Following Huegens and van Oosterhout (2002), we consider organization-stakeholder relationships as based on an Stakeholder management and path dependence 5 explicit or implicit agreement of mutually acknowledged rights and obligations in order to achieve mutual benefit or prevent some harm.
Stakeholders' interests, identities, demands, power, and structural relations create the boundaries for that agreement, limiting the operational and strategic options of the focal organization's top management. A core dilemma deriving from this situation is that a decision or action by an organization, for example a M&A initiative, may induce varied responses from a set of stakeholders, with each stakeholder potentially having a different interest in the organization, as well as varying levels of power. As a result, understanding the nature of an organization's environment, constituted by a set of stakeholders with acknowledged rights, obligations, interests and power, becomes a critical precondition for successful managerial decision-making.
Stakeholder research has approached this dilemma from three main viewpoints: the identification of stakeholder groups; the strategic activities of stakeholders and the focal organization; and the determinants of stakeholder mobilization. Research related to identification and classification has produced various schemes for distinguishing the different attributes and roles of stakeholders. Some of these frameworks are based on economic and legal rights (Preston, 1989) ; others consider the potential of stakeholders to threaten or cooperate with the organization (Savage et al., 1991) , the salience of the stakeholders in terms of their legitimacy, power, and urgency (Agle et al., 1999; Mitchell et al., 1997) , or the ability of stakeholders to influence organizational survival based on their resources (Frooman, 1999) and network positions (Pajunen, 2006a; Rowley, 1997) . All in all, these various frameworks provide a set of tools for identifying stakeholders who may have a notable effect on organizational decision-making in different situations.
Stakeholder management and path dependence 6 Researchers have also examined the appropriate strategic actions, given various types of organization-stakeholder relationships. This body of research has identified strategies for managing stakeholders from the focal organization's viewpoint (e.g., Cummings and Doh, 2000; Jawahar and McLaughlin, 2001; Savage et al., 1991) , as well as how stakeholders can influence the decisions of the organization (e.g., Frooman, 1999; Frooman and Murrell, 2005) . Also, researchers have demonstrated how the network of stakeholder relationships and the specific characteristics of the dyadic organization-stakeholder relationship may determine the actions of the focal organization and its stakeholders (Pajunen, 2006a; Rowley, 1997; Savage et al, 1991; Winn, 2001) .
As a third viewpoint, researchers have examined the underlying motives for stakeholders' actions. For example, Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) argue that stakeholders are motivated not only by rational interests (both material and nonmaterial), but are also mobilized to preserve their identity. Consequently, interest symmetry among stakeholder groups with dissimilar identities is proposed to have a positive influence on the mobilization, whereas identity overlap may reduce the likelihood of stakeholder action.
Summary. The three perspectives described above provide starting points to analyze and explain stakeholder dynamics, but they do not provide specific hypotheses that would explain stakeholder dynamics and conflict escalation during organizational transitions. For example, stakeholder research on the identification of stakeholder groups attempts to predict which stakeholders are important for an organization to manage, at any particular point in time. However, this static perspective does not account for sudden or even evolving changes in organization-stakeholder relationships. Similarly, stakeholder management research devoted to predicting the strategic Stakeholder management and path dependence 7 activities of stakeholders vis-à-vis an organization are both ahistorical and structurally constrained. Predominately, existing research provides a first order view of dyadic stakeholderorganization relationships. Systemic second order effects of a given stakeholder strategy are seldom considered. Lastly, research that examines the determinants of stakeholder mobilization has focused primarily on group identity, without considering the history of organizationstakeholder relationships and its impact. Thus, to develop a theoretical perspective with specific explanatory power about stakeholder dynamics in organizational transitions, we turn to the notion of path dependence.
Stakeholder related path dependencies in organizational transition
Following the pioneering work of David (1986) and Arthur (1989) , economists typically conceptualize path dependence as contingent on history, "rather than simply at current conditions of technology, preferences, and other factors that determine outcomes" (Puffert, 2003) . Many identified mechanisms, such as sunk costs and technical interrelatedness, that cause path dependence resemble factors that generate relative inertia (Hannan and Freeman, 1977) or dependence on history (Nelson and Winter, 1982 ; for review Lamberg and Tikkanen, 2006) . In contrast, the notion of increasing returns has been seen as a new and promising way to explain social processes. Following Pierson (2000) , increasing returns in a social and political context means that the costs of switching from one setting to another increase over time. This argument follows not only the original definition of Arthur (1989) but also the insights of North (1990) , who introduced the notion of an institutional matrix: A web of contracts and rules, which over time becomes increasingly costly to change. In summary, the existing literature lists four elements that typify a process as path dependent: (1) dependence on initial conditions; (2) web of Stakeholder management and path dependence 8 commitments; (3) network effect; and (4) event sequence. In the following, we offer propositions that link these elements with stakeholder management in organizational transitions.
Dependence on initial conditions. Adoption of a path dependent perspective (cf. David, 2001; Arthur, 1989; Mahoney, 2000) allows movement towards a behavioral and dynamic (cf. Barnett and Burgelman, 1996) theory of stakeholder management. That is, such a perspective takes into account process dynamics starting from initial conditions. Integration of path dependence with the structural stakeholder models noted previously provides not only an opportunity to understand the effect of initial conditions on outcomes (for a review, see Page, 2006) , but also explicates why processes may be doomed from the beginning or at least why large scale organizational transitions are so difficult to execute. Following Page (2006: 7) , an explicit definition of initial conditions refers to "deterministic dynamical processes in which the trajectory or the equilibrium depends sensitively on the initial point of the systems." In a stakeholder context this means that the previous relationship history determines the initial condition of a process. It does not mean, however, that the state of the relationships would determine the future trajectory. Importantly, however, the relationship history (1) shapes the process direction and structure and (2) limits the number of alternative trajectories.
Proposition 1: During an organizational transition, a number of stakeholder-related
outcomes (e.g., conflict vs. consensus) are possible. However, determined by initial conditions and following process dynamics, some outcomes are more probable than others.
The interests and identities of the stakeholder groups constitute the state that will affect an issue process outcome. Significantly, these characteristics are not absolute but relative. For example, Stakeholder management and path dependence 9 interests may diverge or converge on a hypothetical vector of issues, but they are never exactly similar. During organizational transitions, the relative similarity versus dissimilarity is manifested by the number of contested issues and overall level of conflict. We argue that a disordered organizational transition is expected to catalyze rather than heal existing controversies:
Proposition 2: The more similar the initial interests and identities are among stakeholders, the more likely an organizational transition will reach expected goals. Conversely, the more contested the initial stakeholder relationships, the less likely they will heal during the transition.
Web of commitments. Viewing stakeholder relationships as an institutional and institutionalized (e.g., Meyer and Rowan, 1977) web of interests and identities offers an opportunity to understand why the stakeholder environment is of crucial importance during organizational transitions 1 . Any strategic initiative affects the existing institutional matrix (North, 1990) encompassing the focal organization. The institutional matrix becomes vital for understanding the costs, boundaries, and the many alternative outcomes (e.g., implemented change vs. failure) of organizational transitions. The twin concepts of institutional embeddedness and path dependence are widely discussed in the governance literature (cf. Williamson, 1975; Bacharach and Lawler, 1980; Coase, 1988; March, 1989; Aoki, 1990) . The concept of governance inseparability refers to the influence of past governance choices on the range and types of governance mechanisms that a firm can adopt in future periods (Argyres and Liebeskind, 1999) . The governance inseparability principle (Argyres and Liebeskind, 1999) explicates two key issues in stakeholder management:
(1) a firm's contractual commitments severely constrain strategic flexibility, and (2) changes in the bargaining power of contract-based stakeholders may obligate a firm to adopt sub-optimal governance mechanisms. Thus, we may expect that existing contractual commitments are an important factor affecting organizational transitions:
Proposition 3: Existing contractual commitments between the focal organization and its stakeholders create inertia and may lead to a single equilibrium.
Network effect. An important character of path dependence (and especially in stakeholder relations) is that the process outcomes are not normally distributed. Thus, the processes to some extent are not only inflexible (David, 1986; Arthur, 1989; Katz and Shapiro, 1994) , but also the outcomes are unpredictable (Arthur, 1989; Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007) . Unpredictability means that early events have large effects on processes (Pierson, 2000) and consequences are partly random. The network effect has very tangible stakeholder manifestations: Stakeholders are not only linked to the focal organization, but also may have dyadic or multilateral connections with other stakeholders. In these dense network structures, almost any incident in one dyadic node may effect changes in many or all stakeholder relations. The network effect is accentuated if the focal organization attempts exclusive bilateral bargaining with some stakeholder groups, potentially marginalizing other stakeholders. Moreover, the more complex the stakeholder network, the less predictable the network effects. This leads to the following proposition: Summary. This combination of propositions offers an understanding of how and why stakeholder management is a dynamic process issue rather than a static planning and execution exercise by the focal top management team (cf. Zietsma and Winn, 2007) . To concretize our theoretical suggestions, we next illustrate how and why stakeholder problems happened in a specific organizational transition: United Airlines and US Airways abandoned merger during 2000-2001.
The case illustration is suitable for further scrutinizing path dependence in stakeholder issues. It reveals the sequence of events, is a rare or juncture transition, facilitates the identification of complex causal relationships, and allows examination of the network dynamics as accentuated by a single strategic initiative (cf. Bennett and Elman, 2006; Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007) .
Case methods
The case materials include interview and documentary data. In the selection of the data sources, we used multiple vantage points into the phenomenon of interest (Jick, 1979) . The use of multiple data sources facilitated the triangulation of facts and inferences. In the beginning of the research project, we collected a large amount of documentary material drawn from press releases, annual reports, news articles in newspapers and magazines, as well as internet-based communications. Such material is an appropriate data source for retrospective, longitudinal research because its original purpose was the communication of facts surrounding the focal events to a target audience (see Burawoy, 1998; Anand and Watson, 2004) . We also consulted several sources focusing on the airline industry (Baitsell, 1966; Greenwald and Madigan, 2001; Kaps, 1997) and its strategic management (Kling and Smith, 1995) .
Our research group also interviewed 16 individuals representing the most important organizations related to the M&A process. Ten interviews were recorded and transcribed, while six individuals only allowed written notes. Interview sessions lasted from 60 to 120 minutes and followed a semi-structured agenda. The informants represent all the key stakeholder groups. An obvious limitation is that the CEOs of UAL and US Air were not accessible for interviews.
Stakeholder management and path dependence 13 Otherwise, our research group was able to contact actors with intimate knowledge about the merger discussions.
As is typical in case illustrations (e.g. Siggelkow, 2001), we began our data analysis by building a descriptive history of the merger process. Drawing on the different documentary sources noted above, we constructed a case history that documented the entire process chronologically. From the beginning, we built an event database that we supplemented the more we had interview data and the further the process developed. We present next the result of the case analysis, followed by an interpretation based on our theoretical insights of the stakeholderrelated issues involved in the M&A process. Stakeholder management and path dependence 14 US Air's strategic position as a mid-sized, geographically-focused carrier was difficult to maintain in an increasingly competitive market (see also, Kling and Smith, 1995 Similarly, the top executives of US Air had an especially strong interest in the M&A since they owned almost nine percent of the company. A representative of US Air pilots summarizes the case:
UAL-US
Steven Wolfe was singularly focused, you could arguably say, shareholder management. I think there was a significant personal interest and he did exit the US Airways with a lot of money. I think that had a lot to do with the receptivity of US Airways when United came to… and again there was a huge lump of cash for him in this transaction.
In other words, for UAL the rationale for the merger was strategically compelling, explaining also why UAL and US Air had attempted to merge previously in 1995. At that time UAL pilots and mechanics had prevented the merger. In the 2000 merger process, the initiative did not become public before the companies reached a consensus. In 2000, two unions had representatives on UAL's board, Frederick Dubinsky from the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) and John Peterpaul from the International Association of Machinists (IAM). According to media sources, when the new merger was considered by the board, Dubinsky voted against it, whereas Peterpaul accepted the initiative. Importantly, if they had acted together, the two union representatives would have been able to prevent the deal from going forward from that point.
The merger plan included three elements. 
Analysis
In the following, we investigate the match between the stakeholder path dependent framework and the empirical illustration of the UAL-US Air by scrutinizing each proposition in the context of the historical processes and outcomes.
Dependence on initial conditions
The history of conflict between the major stakeholder groups can be proposed as one of the key determinants in determining whether polarization of opinions occurs during organizational transition periods. In turn, the closing-out or ignoring of supportive or secondary stakeholders is likely to have a central position in enforcing polarization among stakeholders. In this case, the history of conflict had clear antecedents in the failed M&A negotiations during 1995. The acrimonious history of the employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) agreements at UAL created mistrustful and antagonistic relationships between the top management teams and the pilots and machinists. The case shows how this history of conflict produced a vicious cycle of conflict escalation that was difficult to reverse, especially as there were numerous union-management negotiation rounds preceding the M&A process. Initial conditions seem to be a major factor in a path dependence view of how stakeholder-organizational processes will unfold. Indeed, in the UAL-US Air case, initial conflicts were the most influential in determining the final outcome.
Web of commitments
In the UAL-US Air case, existing contractual commitments seemed more flexible than initially anticipated in the proposition. Even though the process analyzed took several years, the finding that contractual commitments, both implicit and explicit, could be renegotiated (e.g., recently negotiated union agreements not holding in the light of new contracts by neighboring unions) was rather surprising. Whereas existing contractual commitments influenced the dynamics (e.g., pace
Stakeholder management and path dependence 21 and sequencing) of the process, the inertia of the web of commitments did not lock stakeholder positions as strongly as expected. Nonetheless, the sub-optimal governance mechanisms observed by Argyres and Liebeskind (1999) are obvious, but there is a distinct element of choice in many of the outcomes. Similarly, many of the outcomes influenced by the commitments did not seem final. There is little evidence to suggest that a single equilibrium would thus exist.
Network effect. As the classic decision-making literature (March, 1978; Simon, 1957) suggests, rational choices involve two guesses, one about uncertain future consequences and the other about uncertain future preferences. This is obviously problematic when trying to predict the behavior of only a small number of individuals and organizations, but even more so when the complexity of the field increases. If we adopt a network view of a firm's stakeholder field, the problems of rational choice are paramount. Not only do decision-makers need to predict the actions of stakeholders in terms of their historical behavioral patterns, but they must also take into account that the stakeholders each conduct similar calculations with similar computational capabilities. On a more pragmatic note, the presented case account suggests that it is possible and recommended to focus on second order, or "one beyond the next", network dynamics. With hindsight, many of the Department of Justice's reactions could have been anticipated. Similarly, the escalating spiral affected by the demands of the different unions was imaginable. However, the more complex the network, the less feasible it becomes to anticipate or influence network reactions. In this case, it took a considerable research effort, hindsight, a wealth of information, and ample time to understand at least some of the higher order dynamics. Sequence. The influence of stakeholder closing out becomes evident as the negotiating parties (UAL and US Air executives, board members, lawyers and investment bankers) effectively closed out both employees and unions from the negotiations. The intent to merge was presented as a 'done deal' or completely negotiated pact. This is an understandable act from the perspective of the 'rational' decision-makers. Co-operation would have become a notable option only if the parties had had a history of co-operation in terms of 'tit-for-tat' tactics (see Jones, 1995) . On the other hand, as our analysis indicates, the 'closing-out' of stakeholders, even if rationally based on the history of conflict, can exacerbate the polarization of interests.
The sequencing of events within the organization transition process is important not only in a tactical sense (e.g., how others perceive a 'move' in time), but the case suggests that there is also a more fundamental and concrete effect. The order of activities in a negotiation seems to constitute very different dynamic patterns per se, regardless of how stakeholders see it. In the UAL-US Air case, this is easy to understand by contemplating the sequencing of multi-party Similarly, the sequencing of events also seems to be important from the conflict triggering standpoint. An action (e.g., agreeing on one union's demand) has a different triggering effect depending on whether it takes place before or after a union contract has been signed.
In summary, we offer the following notions of how the five research propositions were manifested in the UAL-US Air case: Especially, the importance of initial conditions qua stakeholder relationships largely explains why a transition turns to unexpected direction. Path dependence, thus, is manifested during organizational transition processes. The notion of path dependence is novel in the context of stakeholder research and opens new ways to understand the dynamic aspect of organizational transitions. Thus, the view of stakeholder management developed in this paper contributes to the literature in three ways: (1) It provides a dynamic understanding of organization-stakeholder relationships as a function of past and present actions; (2) it highlights how organizationstakeholder relationships are dependent on small random effects; and (3) it underscores how intra-and inter-group relationships existing within a stakeholder network influence organizational actions and outcomes.
The managerial lesson of this paper is that a numbers-logic oriented tradition of business planning is unable to suggest how a network of stakeholders will react when a major organizational transition takes place. On one hand, as Williamson (1996: 286) Mintzberg et al. (1998: 250-251) has argued that prescriptions derived from conventional stakeholder management theories are simplistic, manipulative, and unsuitable for turbulent environments.
With these criticisms in mind, our paper offers a potential problem-solving tool for stakeholder management. Our starting point has been a significant business outcome:
abandonment of a merger. If executives were to use our insights to analyze the stakeholder linkages in strategic initiatives (such as M&As), the following types of prescriptions should be considered: (1) Given path dependence, all stakeholder groups whose contractual position can lead to a vicious cycle of demands, threats, and sanctions should be involved in the initial negotiations; (2) The financial impacts of 'deal contingencies' (e.g., pay increases tied to a M&A contract) must be calculated by an unbiased party and made transparent in order to alleviate information asymmetry-related incentive conflicts; (3) Explicit strategies for harnessing opportunism should mitigate its use, especially if the initiative creates organizational discontinuity; (4) The complex multi-party negotiations inherent during a strategic change and the risk of uncontrolled conflict escalation are a fundamental threat and should be treated not as a hurdle, but as a decision-making variable (much like price issues, profitability problems, cultural differences or expected post-merger integration problems) to be evaluated objectively when deciding whether to initiate a change process or not. 
